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ABSTRACT
Machine learning systems are increasingly used to make decisions
about people’s lives, such as whether to give someone a loan or
whether to interview someone for a job. This has led to consider-
able interest in making such machine learning systems fair. One
approach is to transform the input data used by the algorithm. This
can be achieved by passing each input data point through a repre-
sentation function prior to its use in training or testing. Techniques
for learning such representation functions from data have been
successful empirically, but typically lack theoretical fairness guar-
antees. We show that it is possible to prove that a representation
function is fair according to common measures of both group and
individual fairness, as well as useful with respect to a target task.
These provable properties can be used in a governance model in-
volving a data producer, a data user and a data regulator, where
there is a separation of concerns between fairness and target task
utility to ensure transparency and prevent perverse incentives. We
formally define the ‘cost of mistrust’ of using this model compared
to the setting where there is a single trusted party, and provide
bounds on this cost in particular cases. We present a practical ap-
proach to learning fair representation functions and apply it to
financial and criminal justice datasets. We evaluate the fairness and
utility of these representation functions using measures motivated
by our theoretical results.
1 INTRODUCTION
Machine learning algorithms play an ever-increasing role in so-
ciety. Such algorithms are widely used to make decisions about
individuals, such as whether to grant someone a loan or what ad-
vertisements to serve someone online. Other relevant examples
are automated applicant screening used by employers and educa-
tional institutions, automated assignment grading, and algorithmic
advice on criminal sentencing.1 A risk of this trend is that such
algorithms may be unfair in some way, for example by discriminat-
ing against particular groups. Even if not intended by the algorithm
designer, discrimination is possible because the reasoning behind
the algorithm’s decisions is often difficult for humans to interpret.
Furthermore, artefacts of previous discrimination present in the
algorithm’s training data may increase this tendency in the algo-
rithm’s decisions.
To remove or minimize discrimination effects caused by the use
of machine learning systems, a fairness objective may be incorpo-
rated into algorithm design. This approach benefits users of such
algorithms, particularly those in social groups that are potentially
the subject of discrimination on grounds such as race or gender.
1Some other related notions of fairness, such as compliance by search engines with
antitrust legislation, may also be readily incorporated within our framework.
Such an approach also assists companies and organisations deploy-
ing machine learning systems in ensuring regulatory compliance.
Moreover, as rapid technological progress drives disruptive social
change and in turn resistance to such change, a focus on fairness
will be required to maintain the ‘social license to operate’ [16] of
companies using such algorithms.2
We consider the task of producing a decision variable (e.g. whether
to grant a loan) which predicts a target variable of interest (e.g. loan
default), while at the same time avoiding discrimination on the
basis of an individual’s group membership (e.g. race, gender) en-
coded in a sensitive variable. We adopt the approach of passing
input data about individuals through a representation function, so
that subsequent use of the cleaned data will not be able to discrimi-
nate based on the sensitive variable. By incorporating fairness as
a data pre-processing step, we achieve a separation of concerns
between fairness and target task utility which offers governance
and regulatory advantages.
Our work provides theoretical guarantees for several perfor-
mance measures of interest:
(1) Group fairness: Using common measures of the similarity
of decisions for one group compared to another, we show
that it is possible for a representation function to improve
group fairness.
(2) Individual fairness: We quantify the effect the representa-
tion function has on the assignment of similar decisions to
individuals who are similar.
(3) Target utility: We quantify the cost a representation func-
tion incurs in terms of target variable utility.
(4) Cost of mistrust: We quantify the cost of this separation
of concerns, relative to a setting where the decision-making
party is given full access to the sensitive variable.
Previous work on fairness in machine learning has mostly consid-
ered the case where there is a single trusted data user [8, 15, 17, 18].
This baseline scenario is shown in Figure 1(a). The data user learns
decision variable Yˆ by training on samples of input variable X ,
target variable Y and sensitive variable S . We assume that S , Y and
Yˆ are binary variables, a restriction which still allows us to work
on many problems of interest, as we show. X may be discrete or
continuous. At test time, on input X = x , the data user makes deci-
sion P(Yˆ = 1|X = x). We assume that S is not available at test time.
However, this is not overly restrictive since X may be constructed
to perfectly predict S (e.g. S is one of the attributes included in X ).
In our scenario of interest, shown in Figure 1(b), the data user
is treated as untrusted. This may be appropriate in a setting where
the data user’s incentives are aligned to target task utility, possibly
at the expense of fairness. Our scenario of interest involves three
2For example, the European Union has proposed ‘right to explanation’ laws scheduled
to commence in 2018, allowing a user to ask for an explanation of an algorithmic
decision made about them. [10]
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Figure 1: Problem setting for provably fair representations. We show train time procedures for (a) a baseline scenario when
the data user is trusted with access to the sensitive variable and (b) the scenario of interest when the data user is only able
to access cleaned data prepared by the data producer. Test time procedures for both scenarios are discussed in Section 1. The
performance guarantees achieved in scenario (b) are described in Section 3.
parties: a data producer who prepares the input data, a data user who
makes decisions from the data, and a data regulator who oversees
fair use of the data. For example, in the context of deciding whether
to give an individual a loan, the data producer might be a credit
bureau, the data user a bank and the data regulator a government
authority. Even if the data producer and data user (and potentially
even the data regulator) are the same organization, this conceptual
framework provides improved transparency.
We consider the case where the data user only receives access to
cleaned data prepared by the data producer, in order to ensure the
fairness of the decisions made. The data producer passes the input
variable X through a representation function f to produce cleaned
variable Xf , which is then made available to the data user who
learns decision variable Yˆf using Xf and Y . We assume Yˆf is also
binary. We assumeXf has the same domain asX , which means that
the cleaned data is interpretable using existing domain knowledge.
The representation function f is learned by the data producer from
samples of the input variable X and sensitive variable S . At test
time, on input X = x , the data producer computes Xf = f (x), after
which the data user makes decision P(Yˆf = 1|Xf = f (x)).
The data producer computes performance guarantees (as de-
scribed above) about group fairness and individual fairness to the
data regulator and about target task utility and the cost of mistrust to
the data user. In practice, the statistics required for the guarantees
must be estimated from a finite data sample.
It is not necessary for the data producer to have access to target
variable labels Y which may be used by the data user for supervised
learning. This is a realistic situation in the case where the labels
are constructed using proprietary transactions (e.g. previous loans)
conducted by the data user. Furthermore, assuming that Y is not
modified ensures that the data user still has an incentive to accu-
rately predict these labels. The properties of f we guarantee hold
for any target task, despite the fact that Y may not be accessible
when f is learned.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2
we introduce related work. In Section 3 we present our theoretical
results. In Section 4 we propose a practical algorithm for learning
fair representation functions, apply it to real-world financial and
criminal justice datasets, and analyze the key performancemeasures
suggested by our theoretical results. We conclude and present ideas
for future work in Section 5. We defer proofs of our theorems to
Section 6.
2 BACKGROUND
Fairness in machine learning has emerged as a significant field of
research in recent years [6, 9, 11, 20]. A seminal study providing the-
oretical foundations for fairness in machine learning [7] proposed
two notions of fairness. Group fairness can be defined, roughly,
as similar (or at least more similar than a baseline3) decisions for
one group compared to another. This is the type of fairness we
focus on improving. The individual fairness of a machine learning
algorithm can be defined, roughly, as the assignment of similar
decisions to individuals who are similar by some metric. The two
notions of fairness are potentially in tension with each other: group
fairness achieves equal outcomes for each group regardless of the
characteristics of the individuals that make up the groups, while
individual fairness provides individuals who are similar with equal
treatment regardless of their group membership. We are interested
in the problem of improving group fairness, without too great a
3For example, an affirmative action system may introduce quotas which do not aim
for ‘equality of outcome’ but rather ‘reduced inequality of outcome’.
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cost to individual fairness or to performance on the target task of
interest.
A common approach to measuring group fairness is to compare
the decision variable probabilities conditioned on different values
of the sensitive variable. The difference in these probabilities was
proposed as statistical parity[7] and is commonly in use [8, 15]. The
ratio of these probabilities, known as disparate impact, is favoured
in certain applications such as the 80 percent rule advocated by
the US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [4] and has
also been studied in the literature [9, 15]. It may be appropriate
to require group fairness only on some subset of the input data
[3], such as requiring equal employment outcomes for men and
women with suitable qualifications rather than for all men and
women. Disparate mistreatment, which compares the proportion
of the incorrect decisions for different values of the sensitive vari-
able, was proposed by [11] in the context of a critique of previous
notions of group fairness. However, as [17] points out, when his-
torical decisions are biased, measures such as statistical parity and
disparate impact which are independent of these decisions may be
more suitable. We focus on these two measures of group fairness
but expect that the appropriate choice of fairness measure will be
problem-dependent.
There are several approaches to improving the group fairness of
machine learning algorithms. For example, it is possible to embed
a fairness criterion in the supervised learning objective function
[15, 17] or post-process the outputs of a classifier [11]. We adopt
the approach of passing input data about individuals through a
representation function, so that subsequent use of the cleaned data
will enforce group fairness [18]. This approach allows the pro-
cesses of achieving fairness and making accurate predictions to be
separated. Moving responsibility for fairness to a third party may
provide better alignment of roles and incentives to ensure fairness
is given sufficient attention in contexts where target task utility
is the primary focus. The pre-processing approach is common in
privacy-preserving data mining, where the data is first ‘sanitized’
before any attempt to make predictions from it [1].
Naively, we might expect that removing the sensitive variable
describing an individual’s group membership is sufficient. How-
ever, the problem of ‘redundant encodings’ means that the sensi-
tive variable may be readily predicted from other features in the
data. A classic example is the practice of ‘redlining’, where the
neighbourhood in which loan applicants live is used as a proxy for
discrimination on the basis of race or class [7]. A solution is to pass
the input data through a representation function, which is learned
by encoding a desirable fairness property in an objective function
which is maximised over training data [18]. Modifying both the
inputs and the target labels has also been proposed [3]. However,
modifying the target label is problematic since there may be no
incentive for a data user interested in target task utility to attempt
to accurately predict the target label if it has been modified. We
therefore focus on modifying the input data only.
The first technique proposed for fair representations [18] learns
a transformation of each input data point into a distribution over
cluster centers. A target task linear classifier using the cleaned data
is learned simultaneously, using an objective function containing
terms for each of individual fairness, group fairness and target task
utility. Subsequently the ‘adversarial’ approach [2, 8] to learning
fair representations was developed. This uses a neural network to
learn a representation function such that an adversary network
predicting the sensitive variable from the cleaned data has low ac-
curacy, while another network predicting the target variable using
the cleaned data has high accuracy. Other works have proposed
learning a representation function such that using the cleaned data,
conditioning on different sensitive variable values yields similar
distributions [9, 13, 14]. For example the ‘variational fair autoen-
coder’ [14] matches the means of the distributions. A drawback
of previous empirical approaches to learning fair representations
is that they provide no theoretical guarantees that information
about the sensitive variable in the cleaned data cannot ‘leak’ into
a subsequent decision variable, relying only on the fact that some
particular learner failed to be unfair using the cleaned data. In fact,
a data user focused only on target task utility may have a perverse
incentive to use a weak learner which makes the representation
function appear fair. This problem highlights the need for provably
fair representation functions.
3 THEORETICAL GUARANTEES FOR FAIR
AND USEFUL REPRESENTATIONS
We propose theoretical guarantees for learning representation func-
tions which improve group fairness, while preserving individual
fairness and target task utility.
3.1 Guaranteeing group fairness
Wewould like to guarantee that a representation function f achieves
group fairness if used to transform X to Xf . To formalize group
fairness, we first consider statistical parity [7], which measures the
difference in outcomes for different sensitive variable groups.
Definition 3.1 (Statistical parity). Decision variable Yˆ and sensi-
tive variable S have statistical parity
SP(Yˆ , S) := p(Yˆ = 1|S = 1) − p(Yˆ = 1|S = 0).
We also consider the related notion of normalized disparate
impact, which measures the ratio of outcomes for different sensitive
variable groups.4
Definition 3.2 (Normalized disparate impact). Decision variable
Yˆ and sensitive variable S have normalized disparate impact
DI (Yˆ , S) := 1 − p(Yˆ = 1|S = 0)
p(Yˆ = 1|S = 1) .
We assume p(Yˆ = 1|S = 1) ≥ p(Yˆ = 1|S = 0) without loss
of generality, since the assignment of sensitive variable groups to
the values 0 and 1 is arbitrary. Therefore SP(Yˆ , S),DI (Yˆ , S) ∈ [0, 1]
where 0 is perfectly fair and 1 is maximally unfair.
3.1.1 Statistical parity guarantee. The statistical parity of a de-
cision variable is closely related to the balanced error rate with
respect to the sensitive variable, as observed in [15].
4Disparate impact defined as p(Yˆ=1|S=0)
p(Yˆ=1|S=1) is commonly used, although we prefer nor-
malized disparate impact so that like statistical parity, smaller values are fairer.
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Definition 3.3 (Balanced error rate). Decision variable Yˆ has bal-
anced error rate with respect to sensitive variable S defined as
BER(Yˆ , S) := 12p(Yˆ = 1|S = 0) +
1
2p(Yˆ = 0|S = 1).
While in our problem setting the role of the decision variable
is to predict the target variable Y rather than S , an adversary may
instead make decisions using predictions of S . Wemay tightly upper
bound the statistical parity of any decision made using Xf using
the minimum achievable balanced error rate, as shown in Theorem
3.4. The relationship between BER and SP for a particular classifier
was previously observed by [15], although our result provides an
SP guarantee for any classifier using Xf .
Theorem 3.4 (Tight bound on statistical parity). For all
decisions Yˆf made using Xf as input,
SP(Yˆf , S) ≤ 1 − 2BER(YˆBERf , S).
The bound is tight when Yˆf = YˆBERf , where
YˆBERf (x) := 1(p(S = 1|Xf = x) ≥ p(S = 1)).
3.1.2 Alternative statistical parity guarantee using conditional
entropy. Applying Theorem 3.4 involves computing the decision
variable which minimizes balanced error rate when predicting S
from Xf . This involves making decisions by thresholding the distri-
bution p(S = 1|Xf = x). Because of the discontinuity introduced by
this thresholding function, the method may be sensitive to errors in
the estimation of p(S = 1|Xf = x) and P(S = 1) from a finite sample.
We present an alternative upper bound on statistical parity, which
avoids both the thresholding function and the need to estimate
P(S = 1) by instead estimating the conditional entropy of S given
Xf .
We introduce two definitions from information theory which
we will require for our statistical parity guarantee.
Definition 3.5 (Binary entropy). For a binary variable with success
probability p, the binary entropy is
Hb (p) := −p log2 p − (1 − p) log2(1 − p).
Definition 3.6 (Conditional entropy). For a binary variable S and
input variable X , the conditional entropy
H (S |X ) := Ex [Hb (p(S = 1|X = x))].
In Theorem 3.7 we upper bound statistical parity using H (S |Xf ).
Hence, making H (S |Xf ) large ensures that any decision-making
procedure using Xf will have small statistical parity.
Theorem 3.7 (Bound on statistical parity using conditional
entropy). Let H−1b be the inverse of Hb (p) where p ∈ [0, 12 ]. For all
decisions Yˆf made using Xf as input,
SP(Yˆf , S) ≤ 1 −
H−1b (H (S |Xf ))
max(p(S = 1),p(S = 0)) .
3.1.3 Normalized disparate impact guarantee. We may tightly
upper bound the normalized disparate impact of any decision made
using Xf , as shown in Theorem 3.8.
Theorem 3.8 (Tight bound on normalized disparate impact).
Let ηf := maxx p(S = 1|Xf = x). Let
YˆDIf (x) :=
{
γ if p(S = 1|Xf = x) = ηf ,
0 otherwise.
where γ is an arbitrary positive constant. For all decisions Yˆf made
using Xf as input,
DI (Yˆf , S) ≤ 1 −
p(S = 1)(1 − ηf )
p(S = 0)ηf
.
The bound is tight when Yˆf = YˆDIf .
Previous work has provided upper bounds on DI for a particular
decision using balanced error rate and the related notion of cost
sensitive risk [9, 15]. However, our result applies to any decision
made using Xf as input. Furthermore, p(YˆDIf = 0|S = 1) ≈ 1,
p(YˆDIf = 1|S = 0) ≈ 0 and so BER(YˆDIf , S) ≈ 12 regardless of Xf ,
while if ηf ≈ 1 then DI (YˆDIf , S) ≈ 1. Hence ensuring BER(Yˆf , S) is
large for all Yˆf is not sufficient to guarantee that DI (Yˆf , S) is small
for all Yˆf . However, we can guarantee DI (Yˆf ) will be small for all
Yˆf if ηf is not too large. Furthermore we observe that because the
proof of Theorem 3.7 relies on the particular relationship of SP and
BER, there is no immediate analog to this theorem in the case of
DI .
3.2 Guaranteeing individual fairness
We introduce the notion of individual fairness from [7], which
roughly states that if two individuals are similar then a similar
decision should be made about them. Another term used for this
type of (un)fairness is disparate treatment [17]. This is familiar
mathematically as a smoothness property.
Definition 3.9 (Individual fairness [7]). Decision variable Yˆ is
D,d individually fair with respect to input variable X iff ∀x ,x ′,
D(p(Yˆ = 1|X = x),p(Yˆ = 1|X = x ′)) ≤ d(x ,x ′), where D and d are
subadditive functions.
We also give a quantitative notion of individual unfairness by
measuring the probability that a pair of randomly selected individ-
uals will be treated fairly.
Definition 3.10 (Individual unfairness). Decision variable Yˆ and
input variable X have D,d individual unfairness
IUD,d (Yˆ ,X ) := p[D(p(Yˆ = 1|X = x),p(Yˆ = 1|X = x ′)) > d(x ,x ′)]
where x and x ′ are independent random samples of X .
We would like to understand the effect on individual fairness
of moving from X to Xf . We assume the motivation for using Xf
is group rather than individual fairness. However, we would like
to ensure that group fairness is not achieved at too great a cost to
individual fairness. To do this we introduce the following definition.
Definition 3.11 (Large reconstruction error rate). Let ϵ be a con-
stant and x be a random sample of X . Let p(d(x , f (x)) > ϵ) be the
large reconstruction error rate.
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In Theorem 3.12 we provide a result guaranteeing that if Xf
approximately reconstructs X for most individuals, as measured by
the large reconstruction error ratep(d(x , f (x)) > ϵ), then a decision
variable that is individually fair using X can be used to construct a
decision variable that is not too individually unfair using Xf .
Theorem 3.12 (Guarantee for individual fairness). Suppose
decision variable Yˆ is individually fair with respect to X and the large
reconstruction error rate p(d(x , f (x)) > ϵ) ≤ δ . Let Yˆf be the random
variable formed by setting p(Yˆf = 1|Xf = x) = p(Yˆ = 1|X = x). Let
dϵ (x ,x ′) := d(x ,x ′) + 2ϵ . Then IUD,dϵ (Yˆf ,X ) ≤ 2δ .
3.3 Guaranteeing target task utility
We would also like to guarantee that using Xf does not have too
great an impact on target task utility compared to using X . We first
define a measure of target task utility, known as risk.
Definition 3.13 (Target variable risk). Decision variable Yˆ has risk
with respect to target variable Y defined as
RY (Yˆ ) := Ex [D(p(Yˆ = 1|X = x),p(Y = 1|X = x))]
where D is a subadditive function.
We would like to quantify the effect on risk of using a decision
variable Yˆf using Xf as input rather than decision variable Yˆ using
X as input. To do this we introduce the following definition.
Definition 3.14 (Average reconstruction error). Let the average
reconstruction error incurred by f for input variable X be
Ex [d(x , f (x))].
Wewould like to guarantee that ifXf approximately reconstructs
X , measured using the average reconstruction error Ex [d(x , f (x))],
then RY (Yˆf ) is not too much larger than RY (Yˆ ). We show this in
Theorem 3.15. The theorem requires a smoothness property of Yˆ ,
which is equivalent to our previous definition of individual fairness.
Our result applies to any such Yˆ , so that we do not need to know Yˆ
in order to provide the guarantee.
Theorem 3.15 (Guarantee for target task utility). Suppose
decision variable Yˆ is individually fair with respect to X and has
risk RY (Yˆ ) with respect to target variable Y . Let Yˆf be the decision
variable formed by setting p(Yˆf = 1|Xf = x) = p(Yˆ = 1|X = x).
Then
RY (Yˆf ) ≤ RY (Yˆ ) + Ex [d(x , f (x))].
3.4 Guaranteeing the cost of mistrust
The problem of making accurate predictions of the target variable
with a group fairness penalty has previously been posed as minimiz-
ing a risk RYS defined as the weighted difference of cost-sensitive
risks for the target and sensitive variables [15].
Definition 3.16 (Combined risk RYS for group fairness and target
utility [15]). For a decision variable Yˆ , a target variable Y and a
sensitive variable S , let target variable risk have the form RY (Yˆ ) :=
cY P(Y = 0)p(Yˆ = 1|Y = 0) + (1 − cY )p(Y = 1)p(Yˆ = 0|Y = 1)
and sensitive variable risk RS (Yˆ ) :=
cSP(S = 0)p(Yˆ = 1|S = 0) + (1 − cS )p(S = 1)p(Yˆ = 0|S = 1)
Original data X
X = xOptimal
decision
Yˆ ∗ 1 1
(a) No cost: RYS (Yˆ ∗f ) − RYS (Yˆ ∗) = 0
Xf = f (x)
Yˆ ∗f 1
Cleaned data Xf
Original data X Cleaned data Xf
X = x
1 0Yˆ ∗Optimal
decision
Xf = f (x)
0Yˆ ∗f
p(Y = 1|· = x) − cY
λ(p(S = 1|· = x) − cS )
(b) Maximum cost: RYS (Yˆ ∗f ) − RYS (Yˆ ∗) = RmaxYS − RYS (Yˆ ∗)
Figure 2: Illustration of RYS (Yˆ ∗f ) − RYS (Yˆ ∗), the cost of mis-
trust. Assume the distribution over X is equally concen-
trated on two points, and that f maps all points to the same
arbitrary value of Xf . The vertical axis shows scaled condi-
tional probabilities of Y and S using inputs X and Xf . The
values of the optimal decisions minimizing RYS , Yˆ ∗ on in-
put X and Yˆ ∗f on input Xf , are shown below each plot. RYS
is the combined risk described in Definition 3.16 and RmaxYS is
defined in Lemma 3.18, where we have RYS (Yˆ ∗f ) ≤ RmaxYS . For
a particular value of RYS (Yˆ ∗) the cost of mistrust is zero in
example (a) and maximized in example (b).
where cY , cS ∈ [0, 1]. Let
RYS (Yˆ ) := RY (Yˆ ) − λRS (Yˆ )
where λ is a non-negative constant.
We observe that RYS may be negative. Both RY and RS are cost-
sensitive risks. This form of RY , which differs from Definition 3.13,
will be used for the remainder of the paper. Our choices of the
parameters cY and cS affect the evaluation of the decision variable.
We saw in Theorem 3.4 that balanced error rate, which is a special
case of RS , is closely related to statistical parity. Furthermore, [15]
showed that RS is also related to disparate impact.
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Table 1: Characteristics of the Adult and ProPublica datasets
Dataset Y = 1 definition S = 1 definition p(Y = 1) p(S = 1) p(Y = 1|S = 1) p(Y = 1|S = 0) SP(Y , S) DI (Y , S)
Adult Income>$50,0000 Gender male 0.243 0.671 0.308 0.111 0.197 0.639
ProPublica Reoffended within
two years
Ethnicity African-
American
0.511 0.484 0.587 0.439 0.148 0.252
The decision variable minimizing RYS was found in [15].
Definition 3.17 (Minimizer of RYS [15]). Let Yˆ ∗ be the minimizer
of RYS for all decisions made using X as input and let Yˆ ∗f be the
minimizer of RYS for all decisions made using Xf as input.
Lemma 3.18 (Analytic form of minimizer of RYS [15]).
Yˆ ∗(x) = 1(p(Y = 1|X = x) − cY > λ(p(S = 1|X = x) − cS )).
Furthermore RYS (Yˆ ∗) =
Ex [(cY − p(Y = 1|X = x) − λ(cS − p(S = 1|X = x)))Yˆ ∗(x)] + RmaxYS
where
RmaxYS := (1 − cY )p(Y = 1) − λ(1 − cS )p(S = 1).
We showed that organizational governance reasons motivate
a separation of concerns between a data producer who ensures
fairness by producing cleaned data, and a data user learns the
target task from the cleaned data. Compared to the minimizer of
RYS computed in [15] which may be applied in the case of a single
trusted party, we incur some excess risk which we refer to as the
cost of mistrust.
Definition 3.19 (Cost of mistrust). Let the cost of mistrust be
defined as RYS (Yˆ ∗f ) − RYS (Yˆ ∗).
We would like to quantify what this cost of mistrust is. The form
of RYS , along with the fact that the minimizer of RYS is a threshold-
ing function and is therefore not individually fair as per Definition
3.9, means that we cannot apply Theorem 3.15. We provide a differ-
ent guarantee in Theorem 3.20 using smoothness properties of the
target and sensitive variable distributions conditioned on the input,
and the form of the minimizer of RYS .
Theorem 3.20 (Guarantee for cost of mistrust). Suppose for
some subadditive function d we have the Lipschitz conditions ∀x ,x ′,
|p(Y = 1|X = x) − p(Y = 1|X = x ′)| ≤ lYd(x ,x ′)
and
|p(S = 1|X = x) − p(S = 1|X = x ′)| ≤ lSd(x ,x ′).
Then
RYS (Yˆ ∗f ) − RYS (Yˆ ∗) ≤ (lY + λlS )Ex [d(x , f (x))].
Considering the general case without Lipschitz assumptions, the
cost of mistrust may take on values in the range [0,RmaxYS −RYS (Yˆ ∗)]
as shown in Figure 2. In example (a), RYS (Yˆ ∗f ) − RYS (Yˆ ∗) = 0, so
the minimum cost of mistrust (zero) is achieved. This is achieved
if and only if Yˆ ∗ agrees for all points x mapped to the same value
f (x), where invertible maps f are a special case. In example (b),
RYS (Yˆ ∗f ) − RYS (Yˆ ∗) = RmaxYS − RYS (Yˆ ∗) so the maximum cost of
mistrust is achieved for a given value of RYS (Yˆ ∗). Using the form
of RYS (Yˆ ∗f ) stated in Lemma 3.18, this is achieved if and only if
P(Y = 1|Xf = x) − cY ≤ λ(P(S = 1|Xf = x) − cS ) and hence
Yˆ ∗f (x) = 0 for all supported values x ∈ Xf .
4 PRACTICAL APPROACH
Our theoretical results have shown us the desirable properties of a
representation function f in terms of both fairness and utility. In
practice, we would like to use real-world data to construct such a
representation function and estimate the performance measures
identified in Section 3.
4.1 Learning a representation function
We encode the desirable properties of a representation function f
in a cost function J (f ), shown in Definition 4.1, which we would
like to minimize.
Definition 4.1 (Cost of representation function f ). Let f be func-
tion transforming input variableX toXf . Letd be a functionmeasur-
ing reconstruction error. Let Sˆf be an estimate of sensitive variable
S using Xf and let J ′(Sˆf , S) be a sensitive variable cost function.
The cost of f is
J (f ) := Ex [d(x , f (x))] − λJ ′(Sˆf , S)
where λ is a non-negative constant.
The reconstruction error term promotes target task utility and
individual fairness,5 while the J ′ term promotes group fairness
since we would like to make it difficult to estimate S from Xf . The
parameter λ controls the trade-off between the two terms.
We propose the following specific form of the cost function,
which facilitates the optimization of f . We use Euclidean distance
for the reconstruction error
d(x , f (x)) := ∥x − f (x)∥2
and cross-entropy for the sensitive variable cost function
J ′(Sˆf , S) := −Ex [p(S = 1|X = x) log2 p(Sˆf = 1|X = x)+
p(S = 0|X = x) log2 p(Sˆf = 0|X = x)].
We estimate and attempt to minimize J (f ) over a finite training
sample. We estimate f using a fully-connected neural network
with one softplus6 hidden layer of 100 units and a linear output
layer with the same number of units as the input layer. Hence f
is an autoencoder learned using a training objective given by J .
We estimate Sˆf using a fully-connected neural network with one
softplus hidden layer of 100 units and a single sigmoidal output
unit. The output layer of f , which corresponds to the variable
5Another variant would include a p(d (x, f (x )) > ϵ ) term to enforce individual
fairness. We omit this term for simplicity, since the reconstruction error term should
already promote individual fairness.
6The softplus activation function is softplus(x ) := loge (1 + ex ).
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Figure 3: Results of experiments on Adult and ProPublica datasets (lower is better on all plots).
Xf , is the input layer for the network estimating Sˆf . We alternate
updates of the weights in the f and Sˆf networks. The scheme is
comparable to [8], although we do not use the target variable Y
when learning f since in general this may not be accessible to the
data producer and is not required to learn a representation function
with the properties we desire. We optimize the networks using 100
iterations of the Adam Optimizer with a learning rate of 0.0001 and
a batch size of 100. We implemented the model in Python using the
TensorFlow library.
4.2 Learning a decision variable
The results presented in Section 3 show that it is possible to pro-
vide performance guarantees for a representation function for any
target task. In practice, we would like to understand how a decision
variable constructed using cleaned input Xf performs on the target
task of interest. We are also interested to compare this to a decision
variable constructed using the original input X .
Using Lemma 3.18, we know the form of the minimizer of the
combined risk RYS for group fairness and target utility. If we are
only interested in the target variable risk RY , this equals RYS in
the case λ = 0. We produce decision variable Yˆf by applying the
analytic form of Yˆ ∗f and separately training networks to estimate
p(Y |Xf ) and p(S |Xf ). We perform this estimation by minimizing
the cost functions J ′(·, S) and J ′(·,Y ) respectively over the cleaned
training set, in both cases using a fully-connected neural network
with one softplus hidden layer of 100 units and a single sigmoidal
output unit, and the same training settings previously described.
In the same way we produce decision variable Yˆ by applying the
analytic form of Yˆ ∗ and estimating p(Y |X ) and p(S |X ) using the
original training set.
4.3 Experiments
We conducted experiments to test the representation learning ap-
proach described in Section 4.1 and to illustrate how our theoretical
results suggest useful performance measures for the learned repre-
sentation function f . We used two datasets that are well-known in
the fair machine learning literature (for example in [3]), the UCI
Adult and ProPublica recividism datasets.7 In both datasets we used
a training set of 70% of the data and test on the remaining 30%.
These datasets are summarized in Table 1, including statistics of
interest computed for the training set.
The Adult dataset contains financial and demographic informa-
tion compiled from a census about 32561 people and contains 110
input columns once categorical features are binarized. We selected
the sensitive variable as gender and the target variable as whether
the person’s income is at least $50,000. This setting is similar to a sit-
uation where a financial institution makes an algorithmic decision
about whether to grant an individual a loan based on a prediction
of their income. The training set estimates of SP(Y , S) and DI (Y , S)
indicate that there is a clear relationship between the sensitive and
target variables.
The ProPublica dataset contains information about 7214 criminal
offences committed in Broward County, Florida and contains 79
input columns once categorical features are binarized.8 We selected
the sensitive variable as whether the person is of African-American
ethnicity and the target variable as whether the person reoffended
7Available at https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/adult and https://github.com/
propublica/compas-analysis respectively.
8We processed the free text crime description column by converting it to a categori-
cal variable where descriptions occurring at least 20 times have their own category
(covering 82.9% of all offences) and all other descriptions are marked as ‘other’. The
categorical variable is then binarized.
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within two years. This setting is similar to a situation where sen-
tencing decisions are made based on an algorithmic assessment of
the individual’s likelihood of reoffending, as in the case of the COM-
PAS tool [12]. The training set estimates of SP(Y , S) and DI (Y , S)
indicate that there is a relationship between the sensitive and target
variables, but weaker than in the case of the Adult dataset.
We present the results of our experiments in Figure 3 measured
over the test set. We plot a series of performance measures of
interest for both datasets, varying the parameter λ which controls
the extent to which group fairness is considered in the training
objective for learning f . For all measures, lower is better.
The top row contains measures of group and individual fair-
ness. We compute the statistical parity SP and normalized dis-
parate impact DI using estimates of YˆBERf and Yˆ
DI
f respectively
(see Theorems 3.4 and 3.8). For both datasets, these two measures
decrease as λ increases, which provides evidence that group fair-
ness is improving. We measure the large reconstruction error rate
p(∥x − f (x)∥2 > ϵ), which is of interest due to its relationship with
individual fairness established in Theorem 3.12. A smaller value
of this quantity means that greater individual fairness is possible
using Xf . We select ϵ to be 110 of the average training set value of
∥x ∥2. The results show that there is a trade-off between group and
individual fairness, with p(∥x − f (x)∥2 > ϵ) increasing and hence
individual fairness becoming worse as λ increases.
The bottom row contains measures of target task utility.We show
the average reconstruction error, which is related to a particular
form of target task risk as shown in Theorem 3.15, which increases
with λ since the impact of protecting the sensitive variable has a
greater influence on f . We estimate the target cost-sensitive risk
RY (see Definition 3.16) with cY = 12 using the decision variable
Yˆf described in Section 4.2. Interestingly, this risk only slightly
increases with λ for both datasets, and for the Adult dataset the
effect is particularly small. This indicates that removing knowledge
of S may only slightly affect target variable prediction performance
if other factors in the input data that are not correlated with S
are predictive of Y . We also estimate the cost of mistrust with
parameters cS = cY = 12 (see Definitions 3.16 and 3.19) using the
decision variables Yˆf and Yˆ described in Section 4.2, which increases
with λ as Xf differs more from X .
5 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
Weproposed learning a representation function to prepare a cleaned
version of the input data made available to a decision-making data
user. We showed that this approach improves group fairness using
common measures such as statistical parity and disparate impact.
Furthermore, we showed that it is possible to quantify the cost of
such a representation function on individual fairness and target task
utility. We also evaluated the cost of mistrust, by comparing perfor-
mance using our approach with a baseline scenario of a trusted data
user given access to the original input data and sensitive variable
at training time.
We used our results to motivate a practical algorithm that learns
representation functions to achieve both fairness and target task
utility. Using real-world datasets in financial and criminal justice
domains, we found that increasing the fairness parameter λ con-
trols the trade-off between group fairness on the one hand, and
individual fairness and target task utility on the other. The results
highlight the value of the conceptual distinction between group
and individual fairness. They also indicate that when the target
variable can be predicted using other factors not correlated with
the sensitive variable, group fairness can be achieved without too
great a cost to target task utility.
Promising future directions include exploring other individual
similarity measures besides Euclidean distance and analyzing the
ability to extend theoretical guarantees to a finite sample regime.
From a regulatory perspective it is interesting to more closely con-
sider cases where the governance model and separation of concerns
we propose would be suitable in practice. Protecting the anonymity
of user records is closely related to the task of protecting a sensitive
variable, indicating the potential to use analysis developed in the
context of fairness to privacy applications.
6 PROOFS OF THEORETICAL GUARANTEES
We present proofs of the theoretical results stated in Section 3.
Proof of Theorem 3.4.
SP(Yˆf , S)
= p(Yˆ = 1|S = 1) − p(Yˆ = 1|S = 0)
= 1 − p(Yˆ = 0|S = 1) − p(Yˆ = 1|S = 0)
= 1 − 2BER(Yˆf , S)
≤ 1 − 2BER(YˆBERf , S)
since YˆBERf minimizes BER among classifiers receiving Xf as
input [19]. □
Proof of Theorem 3.7. As shown in the proof of Theorem 3.4,
SP(Yˆf , S) ≤ 1 − 2BER(YˆBERf , S).
Therefore it is sufficient to show
2BER(YˆBERf , S) ≥
H−1b (H (S |Xf ))
max(p(S = 1),p(S = 0)) .
It is helpful to observe that BER(YˆBERf , S) ≤ 12 . We consider the
cases (a) p(S = 1) ≤ 12 and (b) p(S = 1) > 12 .
(a) First consider the case p(S = 1) ≤ 12 . If in addition
p(S = 0)2BER(YˆBERf , S) ≥
1
2
we have
2BER(YˆBERf , S)
≥ 12p(S=0)
≥ 12max(p(S=1),p(S=0))
≥ H
−1
b (H (S |Xf ))
max(p(S=1),p(S=0)) .
Otherwise, using Corollary 8 from [19]
H (S |Yˆf ) ≤ Hb (p(S = 0)2BER(YˆBERf , S)).
Therefore
2BER(YˆBERf , S)
≥ H
−1
b (H (S |Yˆf ))
p(S=0)
≥ H
−1
b (H (S |Yˆf ))
max(p(S=1),p(S=0))
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where for the first inequality we used the fact that H−1b is a
non-decreasing function.
(b) The case p(S = 1) > 12 is similar. If in addition
p(S = 1)2BER(YˆBERf , S) ≥
1
2
we have
2BER(YˆBERf , S)
≥ 12p(S=1)
≥ 12max(p(S=1),p(S=0))
≥ H
−1
b (H (S |Xf ))
max(p(S=1),p(S=0)) .
Otherwise, again using Corollary 8 from [19],
H (S |Yˆf ) ≤ Hb (p(S = 1)2BER(YˆBERf , S)).
Therefore
2BER(YˆBERf , S)
≥ H
−1
b (H (S |Yˆf ))
p(S=1)
≥ H
−1
b (H (S |Yˆf ))
max(p(S=1),p(S=0)) .
In cases (a) and (b) we have established
2BER(YˆBERf , S) ≥
H−1b (H (S |Yˆf ))
max(p(S = 1),p(S = 0)) .
Furthermore, since Yˆf is a function of Xf , S → Xf → Yˆf is a
Markov chain [5]. Therefore we may apply the Data Processing
Inequality [5] to yield H (S |Xf ) ≤ H (S |Yˆf ). Again using the fact
that H−1b is non-decreasing, we have
2BER(YˆBERf , S) ≥
H−1b (H (S |Xf ))
max(p(S = 1),p(S = 0))
as required. □
Proof of Theorem 3.8. Observe that if p(Yˆf = 1, S = 1) = 0
then DI is not defined. So we assume p(Yˆf = 1, S = 1) > 0. In the
steps below we assume X is continuous but in the case X is discrete
we may write the same steps replacing integrals with summations.
DI (Yˆf , S)
= 1 − p(Yˆf =1 |S=0)
p(Yˆf =1 |S=1)
by definition
= 1 −
∫
x p(X=x |S=0)p(Yˆf =1 |S=0,X=x )dx∫
x p(X=x |S=1)p(Yˆf =1 |S=1,X=x )dx
law of total expectation
= 1 −
∫
x p(X=x |S=0)p(Yˆf =1 |X=x )dx∫
x p(X=x |S=1)p(Yˆf =1 |X=x )dx
Yˆf and S are conditionally independent given X
= 1 − p(S=1)
∫
x p(X=x )p(S=0 |X=x )p(Yˆf =1 |X=x )dx
p(S=0)
∫
x p(X=x )p(S=1 |X=x )p(Yˆf =1 |X=x )dx
Bayes rule
≤ 1 − p(S=1)
∫
x p(X=x )(1−ηf )p(Yˆf =1 |X=x )dx
p(S=0)
∫
x p(X=x )p(S=1 |X=x )p(Yˆf =1 |X=x )dx
Since ηf ≥ p(S = 1|X = x), with equality when Yˆf = YˆDIf
≤ 1 − p(S=1)
∫
x p(X=x )(1−ηf )p(Yˆf =1 |X=x )dx
p(S=0)
∫
x p(X=x )ηf p(Yˆf =1 |X=x )dx
Again since ηf ≥ p(S = 1|X = x), with equality when Yˆf = YˆDIf
= 1 − p(S=1)(1−ηf )p(S=0)ηf .
Simplifying □
Proof of Theorem 3.12. Consider points x and x ′ drawn inde-
pendently at random using the input variable X .
p(Yˆf = 1|X = x)
= p(Yˆf = 1,Xf = f (x)|X = x) + p(Yˆf = 1,Xf , f (x)|X = x)
law of total probability
= p(Yˆf = 1,Xf = f (x)|X = x)
f is deterministic
= p(Xf = f (x)|X = x)p(Yˆf = 1|Xf = f (x),X = x)
definition of conditional probability
= p(Yˆf = 1|Xf = f (x),X = x)
from definition of Xf
= p(Yˆf = 1|Xf = f (x))
Yˆf is conditionally independent of X given Xf
= p(Yˆ = 1|X = f (x)).
from definition of Yˆf
Similarly p(Yˆf = 1|X = x ′) = p(Yˆ = 1|X = f (x ′)).
With probability at least 1 − δ , d(x , f (x)) ≤ ϵ . Similarly, with
probability at least 1−δ , d(x ′, f (x ′)) ≤ ϵ . By the union bound, both
statements hold with probability at least 1 − 2δ .
Having established these facts, we prove the result:
D(p(Yˆf = 1|X = x),p(Yˆf = 1|X = x ′))
= D(p(Yˆ = 1|X = f (x)),p(Yˆ = 1|X = f (x ′)))
using the first result established above
≤ D(p(Yˆ = 1|X = f (x)),p(Yˆ = 1|X = x))+
D(p(Yˆ = 1|X = x),p(Yˆ = 1|X = f (x ′)))
triangle inequality
≤ ϵ + D(p(Yˆ = 1|X = x),p(Yˆ = 1|X = f (x ′)))
Using the high probability bound above plus the fact that Yˆ is
individually fair with respect to X .
≤ ϵ + D(p(Yˆ = 1|X = x),p(Yˆ = 1|X = x ′))+
D(p(Yˆ = 1|X = x ′),p(Yˆ = 1|X = f (x ′)))
Using the triangle inequality
≤ 2ϵ + d(x ,x ′).
Once again using the high probability bound above plus the fact
that Yˆ is individually fair with respect to X .
We have thus established IUD,dϵ (Yˆf ,X ) ≤ 2δ as required. □
Proof of Theorem 3.15.
RY (Yˆf )
= Ex [D(p(Yˆf = 1|X = x),p(Y = 1|X = x))]
≤ Ex [D(p(Yˆf = 1|X = x),p(Yˆ = 1|X = x))+
D(p(Yˆ = 1|X = x),p(Y = 1|X = x))]
triangle inequality
= Ex [D(p(Yˆ = 1|X = f (x)),p(Yˆ = 1|X = x))+
D(p(Yˆ = 1|X = x),p(Y = 1|X = x))]
p(Yˆf = 1|X = x) = p(Yˆ = 1|X = f (x)) shown in the proof of
Theorem 3.12
= Ex [D(p(Yˆ = 1|X = f (x)),p(Yˆ = 1|X = x))] + RY (Yˆ )
by linearity of expectations
≤ Ex [d(x , f (x))] + RY (Yˆ ).
since Y is individually fair with respect to X □
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Proof of Theorem 3.20.
RYS (Yˆ ∗f ) − RYS (Yˆ ∗)
≤ RYS (Yˆf ) − RYS (Yˆ ∗)
using the definition Yˆf (x) := Yˆ ∗(f (x))
= RY (Yˆf ) − RY (Yˆ ∗) − λ(RS (Yˆf ) − RS (Yˆ ∗))
Definition of RYS
= Ex [(cY − p(Y = 1|X = x))(Yˆf (x) − Yˆ ∗(x))]−
λEx [(cS − p(S = 1|X = x))(Yˆf (x) − Yˆ ∗(x))]
We may write
RY (·) = (1− c)p(Y = 1)+Ex [(cY −p(Y = 1|X = x))p(· = 1|X = x)]
and
RS (·) = (1−cS )p(S = 1)+Ex [(cS −p(S = 1|X = x))p(· = 1|X = x)]
(Lemma 10 from [15]). Then we apply linearity of expectation.
= Ex [(cY − p(Y = 1|X = x)−
λ(cS − p(S = 1|X = x)))(Yˆf (x) − Yˆ ∗(x))]
Factorizing, linearity of expectation
≤ Ex [(lY + λlS )d(x , f (x))]
See below for discussion
= (lY + λlS )Ex [d(x , f (x))].
factorizing
Discussion of second last line: consider the minimizer of RYS
from Lemma 3.18. For any x such that Yˆf (x) , Yˆ ∗(x), there must
be some point x ′ such that
cY − p(Y = 1|X = x ′) − λ(cS − p(S = 1|X = x ′)) = 0
and d(x ,x ′) ≤ d(x , f (x)). Hence, applying the Lipschitz condi-
tions we have:
cY − p(Y = 1|X = x) − λ(cS − p(S = 1|X = x))
≤ cY − p(Y = 1|X = x ′) + lYd(x ,x ′)−
λ(cS − p(S = 1|X = x ′) − lSd(x ,x ′))
= (lY + λlS )d(x ,x ′)
≤ (lY + λlS )d(x , f (x)). □
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